Change in the perception of the poverty line during times of depression : Russia 1993-96 by Milanovic, Branko & Jovanovic, Branko
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  V~~~~~~~\A/PS  20  7L
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2077
Change in the Perception  Russia  experienced  a
precipitous drop in real
of the Poverty Line during  income from March 1993  to
Times  of  Depression  September  1996.  As  the
percentage of the
*"  objectively"  poor (those  with
Russia 1993-96  income  below  the official
poverty line) increased,  the
percentage of the
Branko Milanovic "asubjectively"  poor (those
Branko Jovanovic  who felt  poor)  decreased.
Perception  of the subjective
poverty line went  down even
faster than real incomes.
The World Bank
Development Research Group

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2077
Summary  findings
During Russia's economic transition real income declined  situation, the percentage of the subjectively poor
precipitously for most of the popUlation. How were  decreased more or less in step with a reduction in
Russians' perceptions of the minimum income level  people's real income. Only larger-than-usual income
needed to survive affected by such a rapid decline in  decreases were needed to jolt the population  - that is,
their incomes?  to keep the percentage of the subjectively poor
Based on data collected from repeated surveys of  unchanged.
individuals during the period from March 1993 to  The percentage of the self-assessed  poor was always
September 1996, Milanovic and Jovanovic find that the  lower than the percentage of the poor  according to the
subjective estimate of that minimum income for an adult  "social" subjective poverty line. This suggests  that
Russian decreased by about 1.7 percent each month.  pockets of the population regarded their own income as
This sharp reduction in the subjective poverty line  adequate although in the public perception  they were
meant that proportionately  fewer people felt poor.  poor.
However at all times at least 60 percent of the  This in turn suggests two mechanisms for adapting to
population considered itself poor.  worsening circumstances: 1) a reduction in what people
In other words, the percentage of the "subjectively  perceive to be the minimum income needed for survival
poor"  tended to decline as the perception of the needed  and 2) the existence in the population of pockets of
minimumn  was reduced. In this somewhat unusual  people who demand even less than others.
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Introduction
In  the  course  of  its  transition to  a  market  system, the  Russian  economy has
experienced a series of shocks. It has experienced a sharp fall in output: its 1997 GDP is
almost a third less than it was ten years ago. It has suffered from rapid and continuing
inflation: over the period under study here (March 1993 to September 1996), the price level
increased 46 times. It has witnessed the appearance of open unemployment, affecting some
10 percent of the labor force by 1997. Real wages and pensions have declined by a half
compared to their pre-transition levels, and delays in their payment have become endemic.
A few, who have either been enterprising and lucky, or politically well-connected, have
amassed considerable fortunes. As a consequence, income inequality has increased by an
unprecedented speed (the Gini coefficient has risen four to  five times faster than it has
during the 1980's in the United States 2), as has the number of families living in poverty. 3
Against the background of such rapid, and  economically, generally unfavorable
developments, the population's views about what constitutes poverty, and what it considers
to be a minimum income "needed to make ends meet", must have evolved as well. Because
the decline in  income was sharp, it enables one to see, within a very compressed time
period, how conceptions of wellbeing and deprivation respond to abrupt changes in income.
For  most  people  in  most  countries,  these  factors  remain  relatively  constant  over
considerable periods of time. It is therefore difficult to observe the impact of changes in
external  circumstances  on  the  formation  of  attitudes  or  expectations.  The  Russian
experience allows us to explore the impact of abrupt changes in circumstances. In addition,
the question of what the population views as a minimum acceptable income has obvious
political implications: if most of the population feels poor, it is unlikely to  support the
reforms.  This  paper  will explore how  the  perception of  the  poverty line,  among the
population as a whole, has changed in Russia over the period 1993-96.
Section 1. The Model: Estimating the Subjective Poverty Line
In  the  literature  on  the  subjective-welfare  estimation  the  usual  specification
defines  the minimum  income  necessary for a  family  (MYf) to  make  ends  meet  as  a
dependent variable, 4 and, in its most parsimonious formulation, total household income
(Yf) and family  size (n), as explanatory variables (e.g. Hagenaars and van Praag,  1985;
van Praag and Van der Saar, 1989).
InMYf  = fct(lnY,f,lnn)  (1)
2 See Milanovic  (1998, p. 40ff).
3See,  for example,  Braithwaite  (1997),  Glinskaya  and Braithwaite  (forthcoming),  Milanovic  (1998),
Lokshin  and Popkin (1998),  Ovcharova,  Turuntsev  and Korchagina  (1997).
4MYf  may be considered a point  on a household  cost  function  related  to a specific  welfare  level  umin.2
The minimum income necessary for a family to make ends meet is obtained from
the so-called Minimum  Income Question (MIQ) such as "what do you consider as an
absolute minimum net income (per period of time) for a household such as yours?" (see
Flik and van Praag, 1991,  p.320).
Obviously,  the  family  size influences  positively  the  minimum  income  or  its
"subjective poverty line" (SPL)-the  terms will be used interchangeably. In addition, the
actual level of family income, which may be regarded as a proxy for family's "perrnanent
income", influences positively SPL. The rationale is that families accustomed to a higher
standard of living will, everything else being the same, have higher aspirations and hence
higher estimate of what "their" minimum income is. This was termed by van Praag (1971),
"the  preference drift",  and its  value, in a  double-log formulation such as  (1), will lie
between 0 and 1. If the preference drift equals 0, then the subjective poverty line becomes
an absolute  poverty line.  At the other extreme, when the preference drift  is  1, every
increase in real income "exacts" the same percentage increase in what is perceived to be
the poverty line. The poverty line then  becomes fully relative.  Not surprisingly, most
research has yielded the values of the parameter drift between 0.4 and 0.7 (see, e.g. Flik
and van Praag, 1991, p. 325; van Praag and Flik, 1992, p. 10) which accords well with our
intuitive perception that as people get richer they set the necessary minimum higher, but
do not raise it (in percentage terms) as much as their income goes up.
Answers to the MIQ will yield a number of observations such as in Figure 1. We
fit the regression based on these observations, and the intersection of the regression and
actual income Yf (see point A in Figure  1), is defined as the "social" subjective poverty
line. To see why this is so, notice that households to the left of  A have an income that is
below the regression line (that is, less than "society" deems needed). They are considered
poor. On the other hand, all those lying to the right of A are not "socially" considered to
be poor since their actual income is above the regression line-even  if they may consider
themselves to be poor (e.g. their required minimum income may lie at C, much above
their own income).
If we then write out (1) in log-linear form,
ln  M7l§  = ,8o  +±3Iln  Y1f  +,B2 lnn
and let MYf-=Yf,
(I -/,i)  ln  Y, =  o±  +,32  In n  (2)
The elasticity of family size with respect to subjective poverty line (i.e. parameter
0 in the expression of the equivalent income, Y/n°) becomes  8i
1-/33
Figure 1. Determining the social poverty line
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The VCIOM (All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research) data set available
to us (see the discussion of the data set in Section 2), however, does not contain precisely
the MIQ as explained above. Instead of asking the household head for his/her opinion on
the  minimum  income  for the  entire family,  the  enumerator asks the  question, "What
income, in your opinion, constitutes the subsistence minimum per person  at the present
time?"  This  is  a  very  general minimum  income  question,  asking  in  effect  for  the
household's  view as to the  minimum income for an adult (since person  is likely to be
interpreted as an adult person)-not  what would be the minimum income per person for
that family. 5 This problem does not  allow us to  apply the theory sketched above in a
straightforward fashion, but to use an alternative approach.
Equation (3) shows the effective formulation based on the question as asked. We
also introduce other control variables that may be relevant.
5If  the latter  were the case,  the problem  could be easily  solved.  If respondents  are rational,  there is no
difference  between  asking  them what is the minimum  total income  for their family  and the minimum
per capita income for theirfamily.  The answers to the latter could then simply be multiplied by  the
number  of family  members  to obtain  the minimumfamily  income.4
ln AMY = fct(ln Y*  ,age, age 2, SETTLEMENT, REGION,time)  (3)
AMY  represents answers to the minimum income for an adult question, Y* the
"true"  income level of the household (i.e. income per equivalent adult of a household);
age of the respondent; size of the settlement, and region where the family lives. 6 The crucial
is "true" income variable. In trying to find out how people perceive, depending on their
income, what is the minimum income for an adult in Russia, we have to find income Y*
such that it accurately reflects household's  economic welfare. This clearly is unlikely to
be total family income since it does not take into account the number of people who share
it. It could be a per capita income, or an income per equivalent adult which accounts for
economies of size. Therefore Y* is defined as Y/n 6 where 0 is a parameter for economies
of size ranging from 0 (full economies of size) to  1 (no economies of size or per capita
measurement). The problem is, of course, how to determine the right 0. We argue that the
right 0 (0*) will be the one which would make the sign of the household size (n) variable
introduced as an additional control in (3) statistically not significantly different from zero.
The rationale is as follows. Once we identify the "true" household income, there is no
reason  why household's  size or family composition will matter at all for what people
regard as the minimum income for an adult in Russia. We shall therefore try different
values of Y(0*), and choose the 0=0* that makes the coefficient on ln n in equation (3)
equal to zero. Note  also that for values 0<0*, we expect the coefficient on ln n to be
negative, because large households'  economic welfare is overestimated (they are not as
rich  as  they  seem).  Their  estimate  of  the  minimum  income  (AMY) is  therefore
systematically biased downward, which in turn leads to a negative correlation between
AMY  and ln n and a negative regression coefficient. For values 0>0*, the opposite is true
and we expect the regression coefficient to be positive (see Figure 4 below).
Including the age and age2 variables accounts for the life cycle (parabolic) effect
whereby the perceived needs increase until they reach a peak, and decrease thereafter. Since
this variable captures the age of the respondent (not necessarily the age of the household
head; see below Section 2), one must be careful with its interpretation.
We capture the importance of the environment on the perception of poverty line by
introducing the variables for the size of settlement and regional location.  People living in
big cities or richer regions (e.g. Moscow, St. Petersburg) will face higher prices and would
be expected to pitch their poverty line higher. 7 The social reference (demonstration) effect
may also  be important in larger cities, as people seeing the wealth of others  come to
expect  more.  Living  in  a  harsh  climate  might  also  increase  one's  perception of  the
necessary minimum income.
6 The dummy  variables  in (3) are written  in upper  case.
7Our  data  base is not deflated  for regional  price  differences  since  regional  CPIs  are not available.5
Finally, we  introduce time in our model in  order to  capture the change in  the
perception of the poverty line over time.  Our hypothesis is that the subjective poverty line
will decrease as time passes on and people adapt to the new and worse conditions, and
adjust their expectations accordingly. The period covered by our data spans 31/2  years, from
March 1993 to September 1996, during which time the Russian population experienced a
severe decline in real income. The decline is estimated at 14 percent based on our Survey
results or almost 20 percent based on official (Goskomstat) monthly estimates of population
income over the same time period (see Figure 2). 8  The question we ask is whether, in
addition to the income effect, the mere passage of time, and realization of seemingly ever
worsening circumstances, will lead the public to  scale down its expectation of what the
minimum "tolerable" income is. As  the adaptation to  the  less fortunate circumstances
proceeds, we would expect that the time variable will enter negatively in equation (3).
Figure 2. Real population income, Q1/1993 to Q3/1996
(in constant March 1993 roubles; per capita; per month)
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Sources: Survey per capita income calculated from VCIOM surveys. Official per capita income from monthly
Goskomstat statistics.
8 Figure  2 also allows  us to note that VCIOM  Survey  underestimates  incomes  by about 40 percent  compared
to the official  data, but also that the underestimation  diminishes  with time.  Most of the difference  is due
to the omission  of income  in kind from  the Survey  data.6
Section 2. The Data
We use the twenty-nine cross-sectional VCIOM  (All-Russian Centre for  Public
Opinion Research-VCIOM in its Russian abbreviation) data sets covering the period from
March  1993 to  September  1996. The  survey  is  a  representative  sample  of  Russian
households conducted monthly (between March 1993 and January 1994) and approximately
every second month since.  Although most of the questions in the Surveys are concerned
with the household (family), there were questions that targeted individuals. These variables
include, among others, gender, age and education.  In most surveys, such questions are
targeted specifically to the head of the household.  Here, however, the respondent is not
necessarily the household head. The fact that the respondent need not be the household head
might have an adverse effect on the accuracy of some data (for example, the respondent
may not be fully aware of all the components of household income).
The original data set consisted of 91,090 observations spread over 29 cross sections.
The number of observations was reduced to 80,826 after omitting the observations that did
not contain  information on family income (total or by components). When the incomplete
observations were  omitted, individual cross sections contained between 3,626 (January
1994) and 2,034 (September 1996) observations. Although the reduction of the sample size
over  time  was  considerable it  did  not,  according  to  the  VCIOM  staff,  affect  the
representativity of the sample. The sampling procedures used were improved. 9
The basic characteristics of the households and respondents surveyed are given in
the  Annex  2.  The  total  family  income  variable was  computed  as  a  sum  of  income
components: main income and income from the second job,  income from private sector
activities,  pensions,  other social transfers  (family allowances,  unemployment  benefits,
sickness benefits etc), stipends, alimonies, income from financial papers, income from
sale of self-produced goods, and other monetary incomes." 0 The all Russia monthly CPI,
with March 1993 as a base, was used to deflate all the monetary variables.  We assume that
the inflation affects all regions equally since regional CPIs are not available.
In  real  terms,  the subjective minimum  income for  an  adult  (AMY)  decreased
dramatically between March 1993 and September 1996. It started by being higher than Rs.
35,000 in the early surveys and ended with Rs. 15,000 (see Figure 3).li The Ministry of
Labor  official minimum  income  for  an  adult  (the prozhitochnyi  minimum) remained
constant in real terms at some Rs. 10,000.12  The gap between the two therefore steadily
91 owe this information  to Jeanine  Braithwaite.
10 For details  on how total family  income  variable  was constructed  see Annex 1.
1 Calculated  as an individual-weighted  average  of AMY's over  all households  See Annex  3 for more
details.
12The  official minimum  is composed  of a given  bundle  of food and non-food  goods.  Its slight  oscillations
around  Rs. 10000  at March 1993  prices are due  to the fact  that  the CPI that  we use to deflate  the7
diminished. At the beginning of the period, the average subjective minimum income for an
adult was 3 and 1/ 2 and even four times higher than the official minimum; at the end of the
period, the ratio was  1.7. The public perception of  the minimum income for an  adult
Russian thus gradually became closer to the official minimum.
Figure 3. The average subjective poverty line for an adult, the official poverty minimum
for an adult, and average per capita income (per month; in March 1993 roubles)
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Note: Number  of survey  given  on the horizontal  axis.  Survey  years shown  immediately  above.  The
average  subjective  poverty  line  for an adult  is the simple  individual-weighted  average  of poverty  lines  (AMY)
in the surveys;  the official  poverty  line for an adult is MinTruda  Rossii all-Russia  official  poverty  line;  the
average  per capita  income  is the average  income  from  VCIOM  surveys  (same  as in  Figure  2).
The composition of the households, as well as the demographic characteristics of
the respondents, stayed roughly the same over time  (see Annex 2  and Annex 3). The
average household, over the entire  survey period, consisted of  3.1 members, with  0.7
children. For comparison, according to the all-Russia official statistics for 1994, the average
household size was 2.84 members (Goskomstat Rossii, 1995, p.28). The average age of the
Survey respondent was 42.7 years, and he/she spent 11.2 years in school." 3 59.2 percent of
nominal  monthly  values of the official  minimum  might  have at times increased  faster or slower  than
the cost  of the minimum  bundle of goods.
3 The average  duration  of schooling  of the population  over 15  years of age calculated  from the 1993
Russian  Living Standard  Monitoring  Survey  (RLMS)  is a little over  9 years.8
the respondents were women; according to the official 1995 statistics, women accounted for
53 percent of the Russian population.
Most of the respondents (76.5 percent) lived in urban areas, a percentage quite close
to the official 1995 statistics (73 percent).  A plurality of respondents (46 percent) lived in
cities with the population less than 100,000, followed by 25.1 percent of those who lived in
cities with the population over a million. 14
4  In order to indicate the existence of possible outliers in the  data, and especially  in the  variables total
family  income (Yf), and AMY, we create "flag" variables out],  out2 and out3.  All three  variables
were computed for each cross section separately.  Variable out] takes value I if variables Yf  and AAY
both exceed mean plus 5 standard deviations, and zero otherwise.  Using this  rule the total of  701
observation (0.87 percent of the entire sample) was flagged as outliers.  Variable  out2 is equal to  1
whenever  variables  Yf and  AMYf  both exceed the  corresponding upper  confidence  limit of  99.5
percentile, and zero otherwise. The total of 350 observation (0.44 percent of the entire sample) was
flagged as outliers. Finally, we use the method developed by Hadi (1992; 1994) (using the hadimvo
procedure in STATA) to compute the flag variable out3.  The total of 2,634 observations is identified
as possible outliers, which represents 3.28 percent of the total sample.  While the results turned to be
robust  for  the  exclusion  of  the  observations  (households)  flagged  by  out]  and  out2,  they  are
somewhat sensitive when the observations flagged by out3 are excluded.9
Section 3. Estimating the Subjective Poverty Line in Russia
We first try to estimate the "true" household income using different values of 0.
To do so, we run the basic model (3) including in addition to the variables shown there  In
n, as the control variable for household size. Figure 4 shows how the coefficient on In n
changes as 0 in Y(0)* varies from 0 to  1. For 0=0.62, the coefficient becomes equal to
zero.1 5
Figure 4. Coefficient of In n as function of the economies of size parameter
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We then move to  the direct  estimation of  equation (3) using  Y*=  0  The
results are shown in Table 1. All the regressions are run with Huber (robust) variances to
adjust for the fact that the observations are drawn from different time-clusters (that is,
from the 29 surveys) and that variability of observations within each survey is less than if
all observations were drawn at random from the population at large. 16 Nevertheless, as
the t-values in Table 1 show, practically all the coefficients are significant at probability
far greater than 99 percent.
Elasticity  of  the subjective poverty line for an adult  with respect to  income is
0.144 for the overall sample and 0.132 in a regression that excludes Hadi outliers. 17  This
It is statistically  insignificantly  different  from zero  for a few  other  values  around  0.6, but takes its lowest
values  for 0=0.62.
16 That is, the variability  of observations  from the pooled  cross-sections  is less  than if all 80,000 of our
observations  were drawn  from one cross-section.
17 As mentioned  before,  the exclusion  of other  outliers  (out] and out2) does not have  an effect on the
results  and is not shown  here.10
is a significantly lower value than reported by Frijters and van Praag (1994) in their study
of the former Soviet Union and Russia. For Russia in  1993 and 1994, Frijters and van
Praag, report the preference drift value of 0.62 and 0.64 respectively (somewhat higher
than the value they find for the Soviet Union in  1991: 0.41). However, these results are
not  entirely comparable. Frijters and van Praag used a variant  of the so-called income
evaluation question (IEQ)' 8 in order to obtain the left-hand side variable ("the Leyden
poverty line"), while in our case we have as the dependent variable what people consider
to be a minimum income for an adult.
Our preference drift is  also  significantly lower than  the value  found  in  some
Westem  countries.  Flik  and  van  Praag  (1991,  p.327),  for  example,  report  for  the
Netherlands a preference drift of 0.59; Hagenaars and van Praag (1985, p.151) report for
a  collection  of  West European  countries  a  coefficient  of  about  0.54.  A  part  of  the
difference may be due to a "richer" choice of control variables included here (regional
and size of settlement dummies) as well to the introduction the time variable. In effect, if
we run a very parsimonious formulation such as (1),"9  which is basically what Hagenaars
and van Praag (1985) do, the preference drift increases from 0.14 to 0.23.
This  latter value (0.23) is almost identical to  the preference drift  obtained  by
Ravallion  and  Lokshin  (1998,  p.30).  They use  what they  dub  the  Economic Ladder
Question (ELQ) whereby individuals rank their own subjective level of living going from
1 (the poorest)  to  9 (the richest). The rankings  are, like  in the rest  of the  subjective
poverty literature, explained by the underlying differences in real income. The sample
they use  is a  representative sample of the Russian population in  1996 and is obtained
from a different survey than ours (the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey).
The fact that two  independent studies, using two  different surveys, come with
very  low values  of the preference drift for Russia requires explanation. There are, we
believe,  two  possible  explanations. The  first  is  the  difference  in  formulations.  It  is
possible to imagine that people's views will vary less with income when they are asked
what  they consider to  be a  minimum income  for an  adult in  general  (as  in VCIOM
survey) than when they are asked what is the minimum income for their own family. In
the latter case, poor people may pitch their minimum fairly low, while the rich may find it
hard to imagine living without a relatively high income. For an abstract (adult) individual
1  Under  Income  Evaluation  Question  methodology,  a respondent  is asked  to write  down  what level of
income  his/her family  would  consider  to be "very bad", "bad",  "middling",  "good" and "very good".
The mean of the five answers  is defined  as the Leyden  poverty  line. (More  on the methodology,  see
Hagenaars  and van Praag, 1985;  Flik  and van Praag 1991).  In addition,  Frijters  and van Praag  (1994)
upgraded  the reported  family  incomes  in order to take into account  unofficial  sources  of income,
again based  on respondents'  subjective  perception  of importance  of informal  income  sources.  Finally,
a very high number  of households  (e.g.  2,668  out of 8,979  in the year 1991)  were simply  deleted  from
the sample  due  to missing  observations,  and the rest of the sample  was reweighted  (although  the
details  are not given).  It would  thus appear  that, possibly  because  the quality  of the survey  was
wanting,  a large degree  of ad-hoc  adjustments  was made.
9 Without  a control  for household  size, for the reasons  explained  above.11
in a country, their opinions may not be so far apart. Second, a low preference drift may
also suggest a relative homogeneity of people's  perceptions, as people on the top of the
income scale do not evaluate the minimum income needed "to make ends meet" so much
higher than the poor. The homogeneity, in turn, can be explained by the relatively recent
"explosion"  of income inequality which means that people who had more or less same
incomes  only recently will not suddenly diverge very much in their perception of the
poverty line. Clearly, in countries (as in Western Europe) where income differences have
historically been greater and where income mobility was less (in the sense that people
with  current  high  incomes  probably  had  high  incomes  five  or  ten  years  ago),  the
perception of the poverty line may differ significantly between the rich and the poor. But
in  a  country,  like  Russia,  which,  until  recently  was very  egalitarian,  and  was  then
subjected  to  an  almost  random and  huge  income  shock,  which made  some  people's
income increase manifold and other people's  incomes drop significantly, perceptions of
the minimum income would still be relatively similar.
The economies of scale parameter (0) is, as mentioned before, 0.62. This result
too is in sharp contrast with Frijters and van Praag (1994) finding. They report elasticity
of the farnily poverty line with respect to household size to be 0.2. They claim that this
low  value  (compared  to  Western  Europe)  "reflect[s]  the  relatively  cheap  and  good
facilities for child care in the USSR, still existing in 1991" (1994, p.10). However, they
do not mention that 0 is composed of two elements. One is economies of size, that is,
how  minimum needs  increase with  the number of household members  (regardless of
whether they are children or adults). The second element is the cost of children. Now,
while the low cost of child care  might have pushed 0 down under the socialist regime,
the first, and a more important element,  economies of size, pushed it up (see Lanjouw,
Milanovic,  and Paternostro,  1998). This  is  because public or  semi-public goods, like
utilities, rent etc. were cheap relative to private goods. The share of spending on public
goods was routinely much below the corresponding values in market economies (e.g. rent
spending  accounted for a few percents of total expenditures, while its share in market
economies  is  15-20 percent).  As  shown  in  Dreze  and  Srinivasan  (1995,  p.27),  the
parameter for the economies of scale is bounded from above by the share of spending on
private goods. Since this share was high in socialist economies, so must have 0. This can
be understood intuitively too: if public goods are practically free and households spend
their income only on food, there would  scarcely be any economies of size. Thus, Frijters
and van Praag (1994) contention that a low 0 in the USSR is appropriate is wrong.
However, again, our economies of scale parameter is not much different from the
one reported in Ravallion and Lokshin (1998). In the already mentioned study, they find
the economies of scale parameter to be 0.42 (Ravallion and Lokshin, 1988, p.30) with a
standard error of 0.148.12
Table 1. Regression results
Dependent variable:ln subjective minimum income for an adult (AMY)
(1) Basic equation  (2) = (1) without  (3) = (2) with Gini
with Huber  Hadi outliers  coefficient
(robust) variances
Ln equivalent  0.144  0.132  0.132
income (Y*) li  (24.0)  (22.3)  (22.3)
Age  0.016  0.017  0.017
(14.0)  (17.1)  (17.1)
Age2 -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002
(-18.9)  (-20.5)  (-20.6)
Small towns and  -0.062  -0.065  -0.066
villages (popul.  (-4.2)  (-4.3)  (-4.4)
Under 100,000)
Towns (between  0.064  0.056  0.056
100,000 and 1/2  (4.0)  (3.4)  (3.4)
million)
Medium size cities  0.058  0.059  0.0.58
(between 1/2 and 1  (4.7)  (4.8)  (4.9)
million)
Northern region  -0.243  -0.220  -0.223
(-12.0)  (-11.7)  (-10.7)
Central and Black  -0.330  -0.307  -0.311
Earth  (-13.9)  (-13.0)  (-10.9)
North Caucasus  -0.225  -0.210  -0.210
(-5.7)  (-5.6)  (-5.5)
Volga-Vyatka  -0.324  -0.291  -0.295
_  (-13.1)  (-12.3)  (-10.6)
Volga  -0.256  -0.236  -0.239
(-6.9)  (-6.9)  (-7.0)
Urals  -0.194  -0.179  -0.182
(-7.8)  (-7.5)  (-6.7)
West Siberia  -0.150  -0.131  -0.132
(-6.4)  (-6.0)  (-5.6)
East Siberia and  0.035  0.030**  0.028**
Far East  (1.6)  (1.4)  (1.3)
Time  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017
(-17.7)  (-18.0)  (-17.3)  _
Regional Gini  -0.054**
coefficient (by  (-0.4)
survey)
Constant  2.889  2.822  2.847
(82.7)  (97.8)  (40.0)
Sample size  79,595  76,965  76,965
R2(adjusted)  0.189  0.191  0.191
F value  210.6  246.9  243.4
Note: t-values given in parentheses (under the coefficients). All coefficients are  significant at the 1
percent level, except those with * which are significant at the 5 percent level, and  **  =not significant.
For size of settlement, the omitted category is larger cities (population over 1 million).  For the
regions, the omitted variable is Moscow-city.  I/Defined  as YIN 06 2.13
The parabolic age effect implies that the subjective poverty line rises with  age
until a certain point, after which needs decrease. The peak obtains at around 40 years of
age, some 4 1/2  years later than reported by Frijters and van Praag (1994, p. 11). However,
since  the  variable  captures  respondent's  age,  it  may  not  be  representative  of  the
household age composition.
The dummy variables adjust for the size of the settlement where the family lives,
and region. For the size of settlement, the omitted category is larger cities (with over  1
million population). The subjective poverty line is lower in small towns and villages.
Surprisingly, the perceived minimum income for an adult is higher in towns and medium
size cities than in the very large metropolitan areas. We would expect that the "needs"
increase monotonically with the size of  settlement, be  it because the cost of living is
higher or the demonstration effect is greater. The absence of this regularity for the large
metropolitan  areas may be  due to the fact that some of the effect is picked up by the
regional variables.
For  the  regional  variables,  Moscow-city  is  the  omitted  category.  Of  course,
subjective needs in all other regions except East Siberia and Far East are less than in the
city  of Moscow. 20 Compared to  Moscow, the  subjective poverty  line is lower  (under
ceteris paribus  conditions) by between  13 percent in  West Siberia, and  30 percent  in
Central and  Black Earth and Volga-Vyatka regions. In East  Siberia and  Far East, the
subjective needs are about the same as in Moscow. High poverty line in East Siberia and
Far East is explicable by the harshness of the climate (which requires higher housing and
energy expenditures) and its remoteness which means that prices of consumption goods
are  higher.  We  discuss  the  difference  between  the  regional  subjective  and  official
poverty lines in Section 4 below.
The variable time, measured in months with March 1993 as a starting point, shows
how the subjective poverty line for an adult has changed through downscaling of people's
21 expectation.  In principle, we would expect this  effect to  operate through  the income
variable-lower  income would, through preference drift, reduce the subjective poverty
line.  But  in  conditions  of  a  rapid  decline  in  real  income  as  in  Russia  1993-96,
expectations are apparently downscaled even faster. Thus passage of each month (after
March  1993) reduced the subjective poverty line by  1.7 percent. After more than three
years of depression (by the Fall  of 1996), the public's perception of the minimum per
20 Moscow-city  does not include  the Moscow  region,  which is a part of the Central  and Central  Black  Earth
region.
21 An alternative  formulation  is to use survey  dummies.  The  results  are given in Annex  5. Up to August
1993  (survey  no. 6), the coefficients  are positive,  indicating  an increasing  subjective  poverty  line.
Then  for a few  months  they are not significantly  different  from zero  before  turning  consistently
negative,  suggesting  a decreasing  subjective  poverty  line  as time goes on.14
capita income was about 1/2 of what it would have been with the same real income in the
beginning of the period (Spring of 1993).22
Finally,  in  variant  3  (Table  1), we  introduce a  measure  of  income  inequality
(regional Gini coefficient) to account for a possible increase in the subjective poverty line
due to  higher  inequality-an  influence found in Hagenaars and van Praag  (1985) and
explained by the demonstration effect (greater inequality and therefore presence of higher
incomes invites people to pitch their poverty lines higher). We calculate the Gini coefficient
for per capita income for each region and for each survey (see Annex 3), and include it in
the regression. However, we find no  evidence that inequality influences the  subjective
poverty line.
22 We introduced  (time) 2 variable  to check  if the time  effect  may be subsiding  as surveys  progressed.  It was
found  not significantly  different  from zero.15
Section 4. Comparison of  regional "subjective" and official poverty lines
We have already seen (see figure 3) that the subjective poverty line for an adult
was several times higher than the official poverty line (prozhitochnyi minimum) for an
adult  although the gap  between the two  diminished. A  different question is  how the
structure (rankings) of the regional-official  and subjective-poverty  lines differ. Table 2
shows the rouble amounts for the official and subjective regional poverty lines in 1996.
As we would  expect subjective poverty lines are always higher, but the extent of how
much higher they are differs between the regions: the official poverty line is less than half
of the official one in the North Caucasus, but is almost two-thirds of the subjective line in
the North.
Table 2. Official and subjective regional poverty lines in 1996
(in 000 of March 1993 roubles)
Regions  (2)  (3) Subjective  Ratio (2):(3)
Official  poverty line
poverty line
North  8.30  12.7  0.65
Central and Central Black Earth  6.55  11.3  0.58
North Caucasus  6.17  12.9  0.48
Volga-Vyatka  6.82  11.5  0.59
Volga  6.84  12.4  0.55
Urals  7.47  13.4  0.56
West Siberia  8.79  14.1  0.62
East Siberia and Far East  9.06  16.8  0.54
Moscow  10.3  16.3  0.63
Note: Official  poverty  lines  calculated  from Goskomstat  Rossii  (1997,  Table  2.7 and Table  4.20).
Subjective  poverty  lines  calculated  from variant  2 (Table I above).  The subjective  poverty lines  cover the
period  January-September  1996.16
The implication of these regional differences is that the official poverty lines do
not  accurately  reflect  population  perception  of  the  differences  in  subjective  needs
between the regions. 23 Figure 5 shows that if Moscow-city poverty lines, both subjective
and  official,  are  set  at  100, relative  subjective poverty  line  for  all  but  one  region
(Northern  Russia),  are higher than  the official. This  suggests a  pro-Moscow  bias  in
setting of the official poverty lines. For example, the official poverty line for an adult in
the  Caucasus  is  40 percent  below  that  of Moscow; but  the  public perception  of  the
minimum there is that it should be only 20 percent below the Moscow subjective poverty
line (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Regional poverty lines: subjective and official (Moscow-city=100), year 1996
120
Subjective
100  - ---- O  fficial-  --  - - - --  - - - - --  - --  - --  - - --  - -
40  --  - ---  ----  --  - ------- il  --  ---  -
40  --
23 This despite the fact that the correlation coefficient between the official and subjective poverty lines is
0.85.17
Section 5. How many people are poor?
In this  section, we look at the proportion of the poor where "poor" are defined
according  to  three  criteria.  The  first  criterion  defines  as  "subjectively  poor"  those
households that are poor  according to their own assessment, that is households whose
view  of the minimum income for an adult is greater than their actual adult equivalent
income  (AA4Yf>Y*r for a given family). This criterion leads to  inconsistencies, in  the
sense  that  two  identical  households  with  the  same  incomes  may  be  classified  as
respectively  poor  and  non-poor  depending  on  how  they  perceive  own  wellbeing.
Furthermore, we impose a "social" equivalence scale (0=0.62) which may not correspond
to the household own equivalence scale. This is why the second criterion, the "socially
subjectively poor" is, as discussed in Section 1, used instead. This criterion defines as
poor those households whose current income per equivalent adult (Y*f using 0=0.62) is
less  than  the  social  subjective  minimum  income  (per  adult)  for  such  a  household
predicted from the regression 3 (the variant with Huber-robust variances and excluding
Hadi outliers). Finally, under the third criterion, the poor are those whose current income
per equivalent adult (Y*f using 0=0.62) less  than the official all-Russia poverty line (per
working adult). Figure 6 shows the share of households who are poor according to the
three criteria. We can make several conclusions.
First, an extremely high percentage of the population (almost always greater than
60  percent)  is  subjectively  poor-whatever  (subjective)  criterion  is  used.  This  is
consistently higher than the percentage of the poor according to the "objective" criterion
of the official poverty line.
Second,  there  is  a  clear  tendency  for  the  "subjective"  poverty  headcounts  to
decrease with time. This is not surprising because we have already noted a sharp decrease
in the subjective poverty line with the passage of time. As the subjective poverty line
decreased faster than population real income, fewer people assessed themselves as poor.
This explains how the percentage of the "socially"  subjective poor went down from 90
percent  of individuals  in  March  1993 to  less than  60  percent  at the time  of the last
Survey while real average per capita income decreased by 14 percent.18
Figure 6. The share of the poor individuals in total population according to
three concepts of poverty
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Third, since real income  declined while the official poverty line  remained the
same, the percentage of those with income less than the official poverty line increased
from a third of the population in 1993 to more than one-half in 1995 before heading down
toward 40 percent in the late 1996.24  It is thus somewhat ironic that while the decrease in
real income has  made more people poor according to an "objective" and fixed yardstick,
the same reduction  in real  incomes has reduced people's  perception of the minimum
income they need in order to survive and has made fewer  of them feel  poor. This is why
the decrease in the percentage of the self-assessed poor coincided with the decline in real
income (Figure 6).  The decline in the percentage of the self-assessed poor decelerated
only between mid-1994 and mid-1995 (surveys 16 to 24) when the current real income
took a further sharp dip: it required a larger than usual decrease in real income for the
percentage of the self-assessed poor to stay constant. One could say that there are two
ways to make fewer people feel poor: to augment their real incomes fast or to reduce their
24 This percentage may not be compared with the percentage of the poor from the official Goskomstat
statistics that ranged between 22 and 31 percent over the same period (Goskomstat Rossii, 1998,
p.79), or the percentage obtained from the Russian Living Standards Measurement Survey (see
calculations by Jeanine Braithwaite in World Bank 1998, p. 5) because income in these cases is
defined to include non-cash sources while VCIOM income includes only cash sources (see footnote 8
above).19
incomes  equally  fast.  In  Russia,  unfortunately,  it  was  the  second  alternative  that
happened.
Figure 6. Real per capita income (March 1996=100) and the percent of self-assessed poor
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Note: real per capita income calculated from VCIOM surveys.
Fourth, the use of the "social" subjective poverty line yields in all but two surveys
higher  poverty  headcounts  than  own  assessment  (Figure  5).  That  means  that  some
households that are "socially" considered poor, do not view themselves as such. 25 This, in
turn, indicates that there are households who are located in the triangle OAB (Figure 1).
They are  to  the  left  of  the  social  poverty  line  (AB),  and  are  thus  "socially"  poor.
However, their own assessment of minimum income is less than their actual income. This
may indicate the presence of the much-discussed pockets of social resilience and patience
that are often associated with the Russian population.
25 A caveat is in order there. Since we assume that all households have the social equivalence scale
reflected in 0=0.62, it could well be that some households whom we classify as poor according to
their own view, may in fact have a lower 6, and thus do not regard themselves as poor. The opposite
classification mistake is possible with the non-poor households whose 0 is greater than 0.62.20
Conclusions
In the three-and-a-half years  (March  1993 to  September. 1996) covered by the
VCIOM surveys of the Russian population, real per capita income decreased by between
15 and 20 percent. This came on top of severe income contraction in  1991 and  1992.
Thus, the Russian population experienced one of severest peacetime depressions in the
20t  century. At the same time, income inequality substantially increased. What happened,
under these rather exceptional conditions, to the public perception of minimum income
needed to "make ends meet"?  We would expect that the subjective poverty line would
decrease too. Indeed, the time variable was found significant as each month lowered the
subjective poverty line by  1.7 percent. Thus, after more than three years of depression,
the public's  perception of  a minimum income for an adult to survive was about  1/2 of
what it would have been with the same real income in the beginning of the period. Yet the
cross-sectional "preference (income) drift" parameter was relatively low, at slightly less
than  0.15:  each  percent  of  real  income  decrease  would,  on  average,  reduce  public
perception of the poverty line by 0.15 percent. Some of the "sluggishness"  is due to the
inclusion of the time variable-a  mere passage of time amid seemingly never improving
circumstances  led the population  to  downscale its  expectations.  However,  even after
dropping the time  variable, "income drift"  remains low (0.23) in  comparison to West
European countries, where it ranges between 0.4 and 0.7. This seems to suggest a relative
homogeneity of  people's perception of the subjective poverty line (for an adult Russian).
Those on the top of the income scale do not evaluate the minimum income needed to
survive so much differently than the poor. This is in turn explicable by either (or both) the
poverty line  question  formulation that implicitly addressed  the needs  of  an  adult,  or
relatively recent "explosion" of income inequality. The question formulation might have
influenced the answers in the sense that the rich and the poor individuals might differ less
when asked to assess how much an abstract  person needs in order to survive than when
asked how much they themselves need. The recent increase in inequality might mean that
people who had more or less same incomes until only recently will not suddenly diverge
very much in their perception of the poverty line.
We also find that subjective needs vary as function of the region. The poverty line
is the highest in East Siberia and Far East, and Moscow city. The poverty line in other
regions  is less between  13 percent (West Siberia) and  30 percent  (Central  and  Black
Earth, and Volga-Vyatka) than in Moscow-city. These differences are smaller than the
differences in the official regional poverty lines. This suggests the existence of a pro-
Moscow bias in the setting of the official poverty lines.
A  very  high  percentage  of  the  population  (always  in  excess  of  60  percent)
considered itself poor using the "social" subjective poverty line. The percentage of the
subjectively poor tended to decline as the minimum income itself was reduced. We thus
faced a somewhat unusual situation that the percentage of the subjectively poor decreased
more or less in step with reduction in people's real income. Only larger than usual income
decreases were "needed" to jolt the population-that  is to keep the percentage of the poor
unchanged. It is also noteworthy that the percentage of the self-assessed poor was always21
lower than the percentage of the poor according to the "social" subjective poverty line.
This suggests the presence of the pockets of the population who regarded  own income as
adequate, while, in the view of the public perception of the minimum income, they were
deemed "poor." These last two findings-the  decline in the percentage of the subjectively
poor  as real  income  went  down, and  the lower  percentage  of the  self-assessed  than
"socially"  subjective poor-suggest  two  mechanisms  of  adaptation  to  the  worsening
circumstances: (1) reduction of what people perceive to be a minimum income needed for
survival,  and  (2)  the  existence  of  very  modest  (less  demanding)  pockets  of  the
population.22
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Annex 1. The construction of  the  income variables
The VCIOM data set contains a number of income variables that are measured on
both  individual  and  household  level.  Two  reported  income  variables  are  individual:
individual main income (main  inc) and individual income from the second job  (sj_inc).
Household (family) income components include family main job income (mj_inc), family
income  from the second job  (sj_inc2), income from private  sector activities, pensions,
other social transfers,  stipends, alimonies, income from financial papers,  income from
sale of self-produced goods, and other monetary income.
The total family income (tot  inc)  variable is also included in the data set and  it is
supposed to be equal to the sum of family income components,.  This however is  rarely
the case.  In a number of cases, the tot_inc was reported missing although the income
components  were  available.  Also, in  a number of cases  even though  all the income
components  were missing,  the tot  inc took a  positive value. Furthermore,  there were
inconsistencies in reported individual and family main income (i.e. between main  inc and
mj_inc),  as well as between individual and family second job  variables (i.e. sj_inc  and
sj_inc2).
For that reason, we chose to recompute the total family income (variable tot) as a sum
of  family  income components, that  is as a  sum of mj_inc, sj_inc,  and income  from
private  sector activities, pensions, benefits  and  subsidies, stipends,  alimonies,  income
from  financial papers,  income  from sale of  self-produced goods, and  other monetary
income. This was done as follows:
. The  individual  main  income  variable  before  April  1994 (the  number  of  survey,
n_survey=13)  corresponds  to  the  variable  main_inc,  and  to  the  variable  main  in2
thereafter (the two variables have same definition, only the name has been changed).
Thus, for n_survey > 13, we replace the value of main_inc with main_in2.  However,
there is no data available for November 1995 since there was no question concerning
the main income in that survey, and therefore we do not have observations on the
main individual income for that survey.
*  Family main income (mj_inc) and income from the second job  (sj_inc2) variables are
to  be  at least equal to  the corresponding variables for  the individual.  Therefore,
where the data on family income was missing or less than the individual income, we
replace the value of the family income with the observation on individual income.
In  cases  where  all the  income  components  are missing,  we  replace  our tot  with
VCIOM computed total income (tot_inc).  Also, where tot<tot_inc, we take the value of
tot_inc.  Although the code book reports that "0" should be treated as a missing variable
(NA), both  true zero and missing responses seem to be coded as "0".  We didn't  attempt
to  distinguish between the two,  since the efforts in that direction were unlikely  to  be
fruitful.25
Variable list:
Inyp:  logarithm of poverty line, minimum real subsistence level per (adult)
person in Russia
Inyf:  Logarithm of total real computed family income;
lnfs  Logarithm of family size
famsizel-5:  Dummies for the family size;
age, age2:  age and age square;
rdl-9:  Regional dummies:
- rdl -1 if North
- rd2 - I if Central  and Central  Black  Earth
- rd3 - I if North Caucasus
- rd4 - I if Volga-Vyatka
- rd5 - I if Volga  region
- rd6 - I if Urals
- rd7 - I if West Siberia
- rd8 - I if East Siberia  and Far East
- rd9  - I if Moscow-city;
shpen:  Share of real pension in the real total income (to avoid large number of
missing variables, we treat missing observations for pension as zero);
sizes 1-4:  Size of the settlement:
- sizesl - settlements  with the number  of residents  less than 100,000
- sizes2  - from 100,000  to 500,000
- sizes3  - from 500,000  to 1,000,000
- sizes4  - 1,000,000  and more;
educl -9:  Dummies for education groups:
- educ  I - primary and less than primary
- educ2 - incomplete secondary
- educ3 -complete secondary without a diploma
- educ4 -technical college and less than secondary
- educS -complete secondary with diploma
- educ6 -technical college plus secondary education
- educ7 - vocational college, secondary or vocational education
- educ8 - three to four years of university
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Education  categories  shares
Survey No  Year  Month  Shart  of women  Age  educI  educ2  educ3  educ4  educ5  educ6  educ7  educ8  educ9
1  93  _II  0.5915  41.8213  0.0508  0.0759  0.0299  0.0460  0.1621  0.1013  0.2685  0.0324  0.2331
(0.4916)  (14.7297)  (0.2196)  (0.2649)  (0.1704)  (0.2094)  (0.3686)  (0.3018)  (0.4433)  (0.1770)  (0.4229)
2-4  93  q_
2
0.5960  41.8582  0,0564  0.0782  0.0262  0.0449  0.1574  0.0922  0.2764  0.0328  0.2354
(0.4907)  (14,9096)  (0.2308)  (0.2686)  (0.1599)  (0.2071)  (0.3642)  (0.2894)  (0.4473)  (0.1780)  (0.4243)
5-7  93  q_3  0.6079  43.1043  0.0672  0.0857  0.0269  0.0433  0.1561  0.0978  0.2736  0.0319  0.2175
(0.4883)  (15.6351)  (0.2504)  (0.2799)  (0.1619)  (0.2035)  (0.3630)  (0.2971)  (0.4458)  (0.1758)  (0.4126)
8-10  93  q_4  0.6007  43.4179  0.0624  0.0800  0.0266  0,0447  0.1443  0.1026  0.2794  0.0312  0.2288
(0.4898)  (15.4647)  (0.2420)  (0.2713)  (0. 1609)  (0.2067)  (03514)  (0.3034)  (0.4487)  (0.1738)  (0.4201)
11-12  94  o_1  0.5975  42.6296  0,0530  0.0784  0.0232  0.0434  0.1464  0.1089  0.2781  0.0294  0.2392
(0.4904)  (15.0716)  (0.2241)  (0.2688)  (0.1505)  (0.2038)  (0.3535)  (0.3115)  (0.4481)  (0.1690)  (0.4266)
13-15  94  q2  0.6023  42.3752  0.0616  0.0850  0.0260  0.0396  0.1575  0.0997  0.2856  0.0329  0.2121
(0.4895)  (15.2648)  (0.2405)  (02788)  (0.1590)  -(0. 1951)  (0.3643)  (0.2997)  (0.4517)  (0.1784)  (0.4089)
16-17  94  q_3  0.6051  42.3560  0.0610  0.0854  0.0271  0.0399  0.1414  0.0998  0.2896  0.0367  0.2192
(0.4889)  (15.2015)  (0,2393)  (0.2795)  (0.1623)  (0.1958)  (0.3485)  (0.2997)  (0.4536)  (0.1881)  (0.4137)
18  94  q_
4
0.6002  41.9052  0.0584  0.0717  0.0300  0.0379  0.1434  0.0964  0.2777  0.0474  0.2371
(0.4900)  (14.8391)  (0.2346)  (0.2580)  (0.1705)  (0.1911)  (0.3505)  (0.2951)  (0.4479)  (0.2126)  (0.4254)
19-20  95  q_1  0.5628  42.7652  0.0606  0.1014  0.0198  0.0436  0.1494  0.0910  0.2864  0.0320  0.2158
(0.4961)  (15.2811)  (0.2387)  (0.3019)  (0.1395)  (0.2041)  (0.3565)  (0.2876)  (0.4521)  (0.1760)  (0.4114)
21  95  q_2  0.5876  41.5867  0.0530  0.0777  0.0216  0.0382  0.1568  0.1078  0.2740  0.0368  0.2341
(0.4924)  (15.5974)  (0.2241)  (0.2678)  (0.1453)  (0.1917)  (0.3637)  (0.3102)  (0.4461)  (0.1884)  (0.4235)
22-23  95  q_3  0.5721  42.9184  0.0559  0.0841  0.0247  0.0423  0. 1504  0.0977  0.2632  0.0460  0.2357
(0.4948)  (15.8818)  (0.2298)  (0.2776)  (0.1553)  (0.2013)  (0.3575)  (0.2970)  (0.4404)  (0.2095)  (0.4245)
24  95  q4  0.5610  42.6338  0,0643  0.0807  0.0269  0.0299  0.1525  0.1046  0.2715  0.0334  0.2362
(0.4964)  (16.2003)  (0.2453)  (0.2725)  (0. 1618)  (0. 1703)  (0.3596)  (0.3062)  (0.4449)  (0.1797)  (0.4248)
25-26  96  q_l  0.5651  43.5239  0.0470  0.0828  0.0250  0.0444  0.1394  0.0980  0.2754  0.0419  0.2460
(0.4958)  (15.3605)  (0.2118)  (0.2756)  (0.1561)  (0.2059)  (0.3464)  (0.2974)  (t.4468)  (0.2004)  (0.4307)
27-28  96  qu2  0.5618  43.4090  0.0624  0.0873  0.0242  0.0490  0.1409  0.1098  0.2684  0.0359  0.2222
(0.4962)  (15.9206)  (02420)  (0.2823)  (0.1536)  (0.2160)  (0.3479)  (0.3127)  (0.4432)  (0.1860)  (0.4158)
29  96  q_
3
0.5791  42.5874  0.0560  0.0874  0.0285  0.0354  0.1287  0.0987  0.2721  0.0398  0.2534
(0.4938)  (15.4034)  (0.2300)  (0.2825)  (0. 1664)  (0.1847)  (0.3349)  (0.2984)  (0.4452)  (0.1955)  (0.4351)
1-10  93  0.6006  42.7148  0.0610  0.0808  0.0269  0.0444  0.1534  0.0980  0.2757  0.0320  0.2277
(0.4898)  (15.3037)  (0.2394)  (0.2726)  (0.1618)  (0.2061)  (0.3604)  (0.2973)  (0.4469)  (0.1760)  (0.4193)
11-18  94  0.6012  42.3951  0.0585  0.0815  0.0258  0.0407  0.1488  0.1022  0.2833  0.0344  0.2249
(0.4897)  (15.1434)  (0.2346)  (0,2736)  (0.1586)  (0.1975)  (0.3559)  (0.3029)  (0.4506)  (0.1822)  (0.4175)
19-24  95  0.5704  42.5827  0.0582  0.0875  0.0231  0.0399  0.1516  0.0987  0.2734  0.0381  0.2296
(0.4950)  (15.7123)  (0.2341)  (0.2826)  (0.1501)  (0.1957)  (0.3587)  (0.2983)  (0.4457)  (0.1914)  (04206)
25-29  96  0.5665  43.2921  0.0551  0.0856  0.0253  0.0445  0.1379  0.1029  0.2719  0.0390  0.2378
(0.4956)  (15.6012)  (0.2281)  (0.2797)  (0.1572)  (0.2062)  (0.3448)  (0.3039)  (0.4450)  (0.1937)  (0.4258)
Education  categonies:  educl: pimay  and loss  than pnima  educ4:  tech college  and less  than  2nda.-  educ7:  vocational  college.  secondas or vocaional  eduation
educ2:  incomplete  socond.e  educ5:  complete  secondarc  cith a diploma  edacS:  3-4  yeas"  of university
educ3:  comploto  soco.da..  dsi  a diplonta  edac6: technical  college  and seconda,y  edac9:  unieraity completedANNEX 3.  INCOME, POVERTY LINE AND SOME STATISTICS BY SURVEY
Survey  Year  Month/  Total real family income  Per capita real family income  Subjective per adult poverty line  Size of  Children  Share of  Gini  coeff.
No  Quarter  onom quartile  all  top quartile  ottom quartile  all  top  aurtile  ottom  auartile  all  top quartile  household  per household  pensions  (all Russia)
1  93  March  10.802  38.373  95 579  3.546  13.282  36.544  32.066  3 306  0.800  46.4
2  93  April  10.069  34.060  80521  3.365  11.534  28.862  32.192  3.285  0806  --  42.7
3  93  May  10.420  42.154  112.501  3.954  14.855  39.573  37.803  3091  0.716  0076  47.0
4  93  June  9762  37.875  92.956  3.914  13445  33.680  36.063  3.103  0.691  0.100  42.4
5  93  July  8.866  37.961  100.633  3.737  14 157  38.862  35.746  3.014  0.674  0.113  46.5
6  93  August  7.699  34.617  91.403  3.311  12611  33.329  32.676  3.017  0662  0.155  46.1
7  93  September  8.310  34.621  86.559  3538  12.379  30699  30.888  2998  0.654  0.183  44.0
8  93  October  7.342  32.408  83.053  3 146  11.433  28604  29.523  3.009  0,665  0.200  44  1
9  93  November  7 424  32.685  82 325  3 242  11.531  28.296  30.922  2.990  0.662  0.216  42.8
10  93  Decemnber  7 244  28 916  65 434  3 020  10 128  23 977  28.861  3034  0 663  0.212  40.5
11  94  January  7196  35303  97.913  2.983  12121  32.907  27.911  3.067  0691  0200  49,7
12  94  March  7.585  34644  89836  3.200  11965  31017  25.754  3.100  0726  0.204  45.7
13  94  April  7280  33.129  84.205  2.960  11.252  28,252  24.395  3.170  0.726  0.208  447
14  94  May  7.518  31.911  78.303  3.014  10.788  26.023  25.221  3.164  0.743  0.200  41.6
15  94  June  7.334  32.546  81282  2.913  11.056  27187  25.774  3.181  0.739  0.219  43.7
16  94  July  7486  36.701  100.436  2,981  14.301  42.406  23.729  3.117  0.767  0.212  49.6
17  94  September  7992  36909  95441  3.086  13.080  35.037  25.921  3.199  0.752  0202  46.1
18  94  November  7,800  31473  77.629  2.995  11.222  28.417  22.607  3.137  0.705  0.205  42.9
19  95  January  6.011  26.331  65.746  2.552  9.257  22.856  18.508  3.061  0.745  0.246  43.5
20  95  March  6.103  23.090  54.120  2343  8.114  19.033  16.821  3.107  0.700  0.227  41.3
21  95  May  6.136  26.562  66.864  2.486  9.316  24,105  19.044  3.093  0.747  0.217  46.1
22  95  July  6.343  26.674  68.990  2,449  9.772  26.140  18.770  3.072  0.628  0.215  464
23  95  September  6.706  27.113  66.537  2.603  9.412  23.145  18.834  3.103  0.665  0.233  428
24  95  November  6.335  20.409  41.339  2.539  7.302  14.686  17.195  3.025  0.627  0.241  32.7
25  96  January  6.751  27.247  65.269  2.698  9.416  22.374  18.828  3.079  0.644  0.227  42.9
26  96  March  6.525  27.489  67.299  2.417  9.637  23.592  17.187  3.125  0669  0.216  45.2
27  96  May  6.364  27 174  71171  2.485  9.924  26.286  14.709  3.055  0,667  0.227  47.8
28  96  July  6.817  27.009  66.001  2 670  9.744  24.109  15.508  3.026  0.606  0.249  44.7
29  96  September  6.692  27.193  65.822  2.531  10.031  25.228  15.181  3.076  0.685  0.218  45.3
Mean  31.468  11.140  26.245  3.097  0.697  . 0.201  44.3
1  93  qtI  10.802  38.373  95.579  3.546  13.282  36.544  32.066  3.306  0.800  --  46.4
2-4  93  q_2  9.965  38.034  95.020  3.695  13.281  34.312  35.365  3.159  0.736  0.089  44.0
5-7  93  q_3  8.184  35.716  92.481  3.542  13.040  34.480  33.079  3.010  0.663  0.151  45.6
8-10  93  q_4  7.228  31.339  78.191  3.097  11.032  27.013  29.769  3.011  0.663  0.209  42.5
11-12  94  n_I  7.422  34.982  94.632  3.083  12.045  31.999  26.860  3.083  0.708  0.202  47.7
13-15  94  q_
2
7.361  32.527  81.533  2.937  11.031  27.272  25.132  3.172  0.736  0.209  43.4
16-17  94  q_3  7.630  36.804  97.148  3.030  13.695  38.782  24.817  3.158  0.760  0.207  47.8
18  94  q  4  7.800  31.473  77.629  2.995  11  222  28.417  22.607  3.137  0.705  0.205  429
19-20  95  q_I  6.061  24.701  60.649  2.426  8.682  21.153  17.659  3.084  0.721  0.236  42.4
21  95  q_2  6.136  26.562  66.864  2.486  9.316  24.105  19.044  3.093  0.747  0.217  46.1
22-23  95  q_3  6.311  26.886  68.166  2.531  9.598  24.628  18.801  3.087  0.646  0.224  44.6
24  95  qt4  6.335  20.409  41.339  2.539  7.302  14.686  17.195  3.025  0.627  0.241  32.7
25-26  96  q_I  6.604  27.366  66.137  2.558  9.524  22.846  18.022  3.102  0.656  0.221  44  1
27-28  96  q_2  6.505  27.091  69.085  2,593  9.833  25.323  15.112  3.040  0.636  0.238  46.2
29  96  q_3  6.692  27.193  65.822  2 531  10.031  25.228  15.181  3.076  0.685  0.218  45.3
Mean  30.631  10.861  26.245  3.103  0.699  0.205  44.1
1-10  93  8.427  35.297  90.451  3.420  12.514  32.381  32630477  3.082  0.698  0158  446
11-18  94  7.449  34.141  88.933  3.021  11.975  31.485  25.301104  3.137  0.729  0.206  45.4
19-24  95  6.169  25.110  61.386  2.484  8.896  21.926  18.240928  3.077  0.682  0.229  41.4
25-29  96  6.610  27.220  68.443  2.555  9.750  24.523  16.279124  3.072  0.654  0.227  45.2
Mean  30.442  10.784  26.245  3.092  0.691  0.205  44.2
Note: Per capita real family income is  calculated using number of persons per household as weights.ANNEX 4.  REGIONAL  GINI COEFFICIENTS  (BY SURVEY)
Regionk  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  coeff.
Survey  Northern  Central-BICaucasusVolga-VyaVolga  Urals  W. SiberiaFar East  Moscow  st.deviat.  mean  of var
1  34.7  38.3  62.7  36.0  41.3  39.1  39.0  39.6  43.5  7.9  41.6  18.9
2  40.6  33.6  52.0  37.6  40.3  31.5  43.0  37.6  36.0  5.7  39.1  14.5
3  43.4  45.3  43.8  35.5  40.3  43.3  39.1  42.3  49.9  3.8  42.5  9.0
4  35.2  35.4  48.8  35.8  35.6  31.5  43.2  41.4  46.0  5.5  39.2  14.0
5  43.9  36.5  38.6  39.1  38.7  40.8  49.8  42.8  52.0  5.0  42.5  11.8
6  51.8  34.5  35.5  38.8  40.3  34.8  47.3  41.3  53.6  6.8  42.0  16.3
7  44.4  32.9  41.8  40.5  40.3  37.2  45.2  47.5  39.8  4.1  41.1  10.1
8  45.5  41.8  43.7  32.9  33.6  34.6  45.4  44.4  47.3  5.4  41.0  13.1
9  50.2  30.5  47.1  34.9  37.7  38.7  38.3  37.5  42.1  5.7  39.7  14.3
10  36.2  35.2  37.7  39.0  41.0  37.8  39.8  36.5  43.3  2.4  38.5  6.2
11  42.8  36.9  43.2  34.3  40.6  35.9  39.1  39.6  67.4  9.4  42.2  22.2
12  37.6  33.8  50.4  30.8  40.5  47.5  58.9  39.7  36.5  8.4  41.7  20.1
13  41.1  40.9  42.0  43.0  36.8  45.5  38.6  43.7  41.7  2.5  41.5  5.9
14  36.5  33.5  40.6  40.0  42.4  40.0  37.6  40.8  39.3  2.5  39.0  6.5
15  41.7  37.5  45.0  38.2  42.6  38.3  37.4  45.4  36.4  3.3  40.3  8.1
16  42.6  50.9  60.9  39.1  37.9  39.5  35.1  44.2  42.1  7.4  43.6  17.0
17  44.2  37.9  43.1  42.0  45.4  40.3  35.4  52.1  40.4  4.5  42.3  10.7
18  35.8  37.8  43.5  38.8  42.0  37.7  35.0  39.5  45.2  3.2  39.5  8.2
19  39.4  38.0  51.8  34.0  37.8  41.9  42.9  37.6  33.7  5.2  39.7  13.1
20  39.7  35.4  36.0  29.3  33.7  38.5  37.5  41.3  42.9  3.9  37.2  10.5
21  46.4  37.8  49.3  42.9  39.3  34.4  37.5  40.4  46.3  4.7  41.6  11.2
22  40.3  35.3  41.0  30.9  39.8  36.5  47.8  28.5  48.9  6.5  38.8  16.7
23  39.2  36.3  42.5  41.2  34.7  37.4  43.4  35.3  42.5  3.2  39.2  8.1
24  26.6  33.0  29.0  27.7  30.9  28.5  28.8  32.1  28.4  2.0  29.4  6.8
25  27.7  36.6  34.0  38.8  41.2  36.8  35.7  42.2  44.9  4.8  37.5  12.7
26  40.7  38.4  45.7  33.4  45.0  35.9  29.5  48.5  40.6  5.8  39.7  14.6
27  32.2  33.7  39.6  36.9  56.2  40.3  46.5  39.6  48.9  7.3  41.6  17.5
28  36.4  41.4  49.4  35.6  36.2  39.6  41.2  40.1  41.4  3.9  40.1  9.8
29  37.7  39.3  44.7  34.1  33.7  38.4  41.2  42.1  44.8  3.8  39.6  9.7Annex 5. Regression results with cross section dummies
Dependent variable: In subjective minimum income for an adult (AMY)
(1) Basic  (2) = (1) without  (4)  =  (3)  with
equation with  Hadi outliers  Gini coefficient
Huber (robust)
variances
Ln family  income  0.139  0.127  0.123
1/  (39.0)  (36.7)  (35.1)
Age  0.016  0.017  0.018
(18.5)  (20.6)  (21.4)
Age2 -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002
(-23.9)  (-26.0)  (-26.9)
Small towns and  -0.062  -0.065  -0.064
villages  (-7.9)  (-8.8)  (-8.5)
(population
under 100,000)
Towns (between  0.066  0.577  0.058
100,000  and  1/2  (7.5)  (6.9)  (7.0)
million)
Medium size  0.060  0.060  0.060
cities (between l/2  (5.7)  (6.0)  (6.0)
and 1 million)
Northern region  -0.243  -0.221  -0.222
(-24.1)  (-23.4)  (-23.5)
Central and  -0.330  -0.309  -0.311
Black Earth  (-29.4)  (-29.1)  (-29.3)
North Caucasus  -0.225  -0.211  -0.214
(-18.3)  (-18.0)  (-18.4)
Volga-Vyatka  -0.324  -0.292  -0.294
(-25.5)  (-24.1)  (-24.2)
Volga  -0.257  -0.238  -0.241
(-21.8)  (-21.3)  (-21.6)
Urals  -0.194  -0.180  -0.180
(-18.0)  (-17.7)  (-17.8)
West Siberia  -0.147  -0.128  -0.130
(-12.4)  (-11.4)  (-11.6)
East Siberia and  0.034  0.027*  0.029*
Far East  (2.7)  (2.3)  (2.5)
Gini coefficient  -0.033
(26.7)
Survey 2  -0.003**  -0.006**  0.115
(-0.2)  (-0.4)  (7.5)
Survey 3  0.116  0.085  0.065
(6.6)  (5.2)  (3.9)
Survey 4  0.144  0.135  0.266(8.5)  (8.5)  (18.8)
5  0.123  0.097  0.093
(7.1)  (5.9)  (5.7)
6  0.626  0.515  0.061
(3.7)  (3.2)  (3.8)
7  0.026**  0.012**  0.091
(1.5)  (0.8)  (6.4)
8  -0.014**  -0.033*  0.042
(-0.8)  (-2.1)  (2.8)
9  -0.021**  -0.022**  0.097
(-1.2)  (-1.4)  (6.7)
10  -0.060  -0.057  0.134
(-3.5)  (-3.6)  (9.8)
11  -0.099  -0.096  -0.204
(-5.8)  (-6.1)  (-11.2)
12  -0.122  -0.116  -0.093
(-7.4)  (-7.4)  (-6.1)
13  -0.173  -0.168  -0.113
(-9.9)  (-10.1)  (-7.2)
14  -0.123  -0.122  0.035*
(-7.0)  (-7.3)  (2.3)
15  -0.099  -0.098  -0.011 **
(-5.7)  (-6.0)  (-0.8)
16  -0.195  -0.199  -0.302
(-11.  1)  (-I11.9)  (-16.1)
17  -0.098  -0.078  -0.068
(-5.6)  (-4.7)  (-4.1)
18  -0.249  -0.236  -0.122
(-14.0)  (-13.8)  (-7.9)
19  -0.383  -0.377  -0.281
(-19.5)  (-19.9)  (-15.9)
20  -0.455  -0.444  -0.278
(-24.5)  (-24.8)  (-17.3)
21  -0.395  -0.399  -0.390
(-21.9)  (-23.4)  (-23.1)
22  -0.393  -0.390  -0.393
(-21.9)  (-23.0)  (-23.2)
23  -0.370  -0.371  -0.256
(-21.2)  (-22.4)  (-17.2)
24  -0.445  -0.447  Dropped
(-24.9)  (-26.5)
25  -0.391  -0.386  -0.274
(-22.4)  (-23.3)  (-18.4)
26  -0.455  -0.440  -0.401
(-25.4)  (-25.5)  (-24.3)
Survey 27  -0.638  -0.640  -0.686
(-35.6)  (-38.1)  (-38.9)
28  -0.580  -0.585  -0.531(-32.0)  (-34.2)  (-32.8)
29  -0.615  -0.611  -0.575
(-33.7)  (-35.4)  (-34.5)
Constant  2.774  2.720  1.204
(106.1)  (110.1)  (22.7)
Sample size  79,595  76,965  76,965
R2  0.462  0.489  0.490
F value  1661.1  1782.5  1745.7
Note:  t-values  given  in  parentheses  (under  the  coefficients).  All  coefficients  are
significant at the 1 percent level, except those with * which are significant at the 5 percent level,
and  ** =not significant.
For size of settlement, the omitted category is larger cities (population over  1 million).
For the regions, the omitted variable is Moscow-city.  1/ Defined as Y/NO.62.Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2059 Financial  Intermediation  and Growth: Ross  Levine  February  1999  K. Labrie
Causality  and Causes  Norman  Loayza  31001
Thorsten  Beck
WPS2060 The  Macroeconomics  of Delayed  Daniel  Kaufmann  February  1999  D. Bouvet
Exchange-Rate  Unification:  Theory  Stephen  A. O'Connell  35818
And Evidence  from Tanzania
WPS2061  A Framework  for Regulating  Hennie  van Greuning  February  1999  A. Thornton
Microfinance  Institutions  Joselito  Gailardo  80409
Bikki Randhawa
WPS2062 Does  Financial  Reform  Increase  Oriana  Bandiera  February  1999  A. Yaptenco
or Reduce  Savings?  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  38526
Patrick  Honohan
Fabio  Schiantarelli
WPS2063 The  Practice  of Access  Pricing:  Tommasso  M. Valletti  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Telecommunications  in the United  36370
Kingdom
WPS2064 Regulating  Privatized  Rail  Transport  Javier  Campos  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Pedro  Cantos  36370
WPS2065 Exporting,  Externalities,  and  Howard  Pack  February  1999  C. Bemardo
Technology  Transfer  Kamal  Saggi  31148
WPS2068 Flight  Capital  as a Portfolio  Choice  Paul  Collier  February  1999  A. Kitson-Wafters
Anke  Hoeffler  33712
Catherine  Pattillo
WPS2067 Multinational  Firms and  Technology  Amy Jocelyn  Glass  February  1999  L. Tabada
Transfer  Kamal  Saggi  36896
WPS2068 Quitting  and  Labor  Turnover:  Tom Krebs  February  1999  T. Gomez
Microeconomic  Evidence  and  William F. Maloney  32127
Macroeconomic  Consequences
WPS2069 Logit  Analysis  in a Rotating  Panel  Patricio  Aroca GonzAlez  February  1999  T. Gomez
Context  and  an Application  to  William F. Maloney  32127
Self-Employment  Decisions
WPS2070 The  Search  for the Key:  Aid,  David  Dollar  March  1999  E. Khine
Investment,  and Policies  in Africa  William Easterly  37471
WPS2071 The  World Bank's  Unified  Survey  Jos Verbeek  March  1999  M. Galatis
Projections:  How  Accurate  Are  31177
They?  An Ex-Post  Evaluation  of
US91-US97Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2072  Growth,  Poverty,  and Inequality:  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
A Regional  Panel  for Bangladesh  80425
WPS2073  Politics,  Transaction  Costs,  and  the  Antonio  Estache  March 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Design  of Regulatory  Institutions  David  Martimort  36370
WPS2074 Light and Lightning  at  the End of  Antonio  Estache  March 1999  G. Chenet-Smith
the Public  Tunnel:  Reform  of  the  Martin  Rodriguez-Pardina  36370
Electricity  Sector  in the Southern
Cone
WPS2075  Between  Group  Inequality  and  Quentin  T. Wodon  March 1999  J. Badami
Targeted  Transfers  80425
WPS2076 Microdeterminants  of Consumption,  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
Poverty,  Growth,  and Inequality  in  80425
Bangladesh